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News Division, Office of Public Affairs, Room 404-A, U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C. 20250

REMARKS PREPARED FOR DELIVERY BY
CLAYTON YEUTIER
SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE
TO THE CHICAGO FARMERS
Chicago, Illinois

September 14, 1990

It's a great pleasure for me to be back in Chicago, especially when it means seeing
so many friends and acquaintances. I'd like to thank The Chicago Farmers for extending
to me this invitation to talk with you today about America's agricultural future.
As you know, Congress is struggling to resolve differences between their respective
versions of the 1990 Farm Bill. What you may not know -- and what I'd like to discuss with
you today -- is that in several notable instances neither version reflects what America's
farmers have asked for, nor what America's farmers, as well as America's consumers, need.
At stake here is, quite literally, the future of America's farmers, and our
competitiveness in the years and decades ahead.

"A Blast From the Past"
To fully appreciate what is at stake in this upcoming Farm Bill, one only has to recall
what America's farmers went through during what I refer to as "The Dark Ages," that period
in the early 1980's when Congress argued that it could safely raise support levels without
damaging competitiveness, without causing higher budget outlays, without leading to
increased supply controls, and without hurting American agriculture.
The end result of this "reign of error" was a near-catastrophic failure of America's
farming industry and a full-blown depression among America's farmers.
Our competitors climbed under our price umbrella, increased production and
undersold us in the marketplace. Here at home, exports plummeted, farm incomes shrank
while farm program costs skyrocketed and land prices fell into the pits. Most tragic of all,
thousands of otherwise good, productive farmers -- some of them no doubt your
neighbors -- simply disappeared, losing out not to better farmers from across the county, but
to misguided, short-sighted farm policies enacted by non-farmer politicians in Washington,
D.C.
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Thankfully, enlightenment -- and just plain old common sense -- was there, just
waiting to be used. In 1985, at the height of our farm depression, a farm bill was passed
that helped put America's farmers back on the road to prosperity.
By refocusing our farm policies toward market-driven programs, American agriculture
became internationally competitive once again, reclaiming lost markets and lost income.
The artificially high loan rates of the 1981 bill were decreased and a host of other changes
were made to reflect a market-oriented farm economy. Those changes also reflected a new
international orientation, a realization that we must compete in a global marketplace.
The results speak for themselves. The Food Security Act of 1985 helped build farm exports
from $26 billion up to $40 billion, reduced carryover stocks, raised net farm income to new
record highs, reduced farmers' debt loads, and eventually pared Government farm support
costs from $26 billion to $8 billion.
Well folks, it's election year, and guess what? Better bring in the cattle andlock the
tractors in the barn, 'cause the politicians are on the prowl, and a lot of them are looking
for politically expedient, short term solutions to whatever problems they think you have.
"Back to the Future"
Why else would Congress even entertain the idea of returning to the failed policies
of the 1981 Farm Bill, much less write these same policies into a farm bill for the 1990's?
Why else would Congress think that, five short years after near-catastrophe, they can
manipulate loan rates without affecting America's export competitiveness?
Why else would Congress, even after hearing America's farmers tell them to leave
the Farm Bill alone, produce a 1,600 page document wrought with cha~ges?
And the gall of it all, the one thing American farmers have asked for, planting
flexibility, Congress refuses to grant. What's going on? Does Congress think that farmer's
can't remember ten, even five short years ago?
Well, farmers do remember. They have vivid memories because they pay the price
for short sighted, wrong headed policies.
Do they think America's farmers will sell America's agricultural soul for an increase
in loan rates? Well, they won't, unless that result is foisted on them by the Congress.
Farmers know better.
"A Horse Is a Horse...1"
Congress is betting that the farm community will follow the adage of not looking a
gift horse in the mouth. I think they're making a big mistake.
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Farmers are not a bunch of country bumpkins, and this is one gift horse America's
farmers will look in the mouth. When they do, they're going to see a Trojan horse in our
midst, with a belly full of malodorous policy cadavers left over from the pre-'85 farm bill,
cadavers which haven't seen the light of day for five years, but which Congress proposes to
turn loose to run amuck in our farm sector, convinced the results will be much better, this
time. I suppose that could be called .optimism.
All this is a shame, because Congress and the Administration worked hard to get a
very good farm bill on the books in '85, and we can do the same in 1990, regardless of the
partisan shrill of some members of Congress who claim the Administration hasn't come
forward with sufficient guidance for a 1990 Farm Bill.
Nothing could be further from the truth. It wasn't that the Congress had no guidance
from the Administration and the Secretary of Agriculture. They simply chose to ignore
much of that guidance, and to ignore much of the input they got from farmers th~mselves.
"Red Means Stop. Green Means Go"
After talking with America's farmers, farm organizations, commodity groups,
agribusiness and industry representatives, the academic community, and members of
Congress, we published a book back in February that spells out in great detail the
Administration's proposals for continuing the successful course set in the 1985 legislation.
We call it our "Green Book," our "go" book, because it's filled with workable, proven
policies -- all of them building on the successes of the 1985 Act, while avoiding the mistakes
of 1981. Though time won't allow me to review all of these proposals with you today -- the
Green Book consists of more than 145 pages worth of very specific policy recommendations
-- I would like to mention a few of the more obvious areas where important differences
between the Administration and Congress still exist.
Dairy: The proposed legislation provides a rigid price floor of $lO.lO/cwt. and
provisions which are certain to bring production quotas or other draconian supply control
measures as surpluses build up at the fixed floor price. This combination is ill-conceived
and self-destructive. It will clearly lead us down a path to gigantic surpluses, and is designed
to place the cost burden of those surpluses on the backs of American consumers.
Dairy farmers are already beginning to expand production, even before these
provisions become law! California milk production in July was up 8 percent from a year
earlier, and the whole country's was up 5 percent. Expansion is encouraged by the price
floor, and even more so by the expectation that supply controls will be introduced when
surpluses arise. Producers are beginning a "race for base" in anticipation of regulated quotas
limiting their domestic marketing. If the legislation passes in its present form, we'll be well
on our way to creating a permanent regulatory apparatus for U.S. dairy production.

4

These provisions are the antithesis of market principles, diametrically contrary to the
progress and principle of the 1985 Farm Bill, and must be changed. Such retrogression is
not acceptable. Our export oriented industries -- corn, soybeans, cotton, rice, wheat, cattle,
hogs, and others -- should pay close attention to what the Congress does on this issue.
Passage of this pending dairy legislation could demolish their opportunities for opening up
additional export markets.
Loan Rates and Acrea&e Reduction Pro2fams (ARPS): Though these are separate
issues, the policy consequences are nearly identical, so I'll treat them together.
Whenever prices trend downward, as they have on wheat in recent weeks, there is
always a temptation for Congress to raise loan rates, take land out of production, or both.
The latter presumably will raise prices by reducing supplies in future years, and the former
provides a price floor for products that farmers have not yet sold. These are politically
expedient moves, and they provide at least some short term benefits to farmers.
But we must have a longer term view than that, or we'll discover that we've helped
ourselves in the short run while shooting ourselves in the foot in the long run. That is
precisely what we did in the early '80s and we all know the results. Higher price floors led
to a huge accumulation of surpluses, our exports collapsed, farm incomes plummeted, land
values deteriorated, and thousands of farmers went out of business. All this while
government thought it was helping!
We simply must learn that higher loan rates may provide a more attractive safety net
for our producers, but they also provide a similarly attractive price umbrella for our
competitors. The impact of the latter often overwhelms the former, and that gets us all in
trouble. Our price umbrella stimulates a production response in competitor nations, and
those additional supplies come back to haunt us on the world market. We've repeated that
unfortunate experience on numerous occasions over the past half century and loan rates
higher than those provided for in current law should be rejected out-of-hand.
Encouraging higher ARPs, or other schemes to take land out of production, has the
same effect. Why do you suppose negotiators from other countries are clamoring in the
Uruguay Round for the United States to sustain or increase its set-aside acreage? Not
because they're interested in our farm incomes, I assure you. It is because they are
interested in their farm incomes! They know that if we'll "unilaterally disarm" by pulling
additional land out of production, that makes us less competitive and gives them a golden
opportunity to increase market share. We cut back our production; they increase theirs.
A good deal if you can get it -- for them! We did that to ourselves just a few years ago, and
we've been paying for that mistake ever since. I'm going to do everything in my power to
avoid that result now, and that means we're going to have to change a number of ARP
provisions in the 1990 Farm Bill.
Flexibility: Every farmer I've talked to since becoming Secretary of Agriculture
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would like more flexibility in his operations. Every farmer I've talked to would like to see
farm programs simplified. Every farmer I've talked to would like to make more of his own
decisions, and have fewer decisions imposed upon him by the federal government.
So what does Congress do? It passes a 1,600-page piece of legislation that goes in
precisely the opposite direction! Why would Congress do such a thing -- seemingly contrary
to the wishes of its own constituency? Everyone is entitled to his own analysis of that
phenomenon, but my view is that Congress does not want farmers to make their own
decisions. Political power comes from having those decisions centered in Washington, D.C.,
and Congress likes power. The same analysis applies to farm organizations. Their
survivability and their staff jobs depend on political activity here in Washington. Putting
decisions in farmers' hands makes Congress and farm organizations less relevant. Hence,
there is a strong self-interest motivation on the part of many members of Congress and
many farm organizations to make farm programs rigid and complex, rather than simple and
flexible.
Who pays the price? The farmer, of course. And the environment, for rigid,
inflexible farm programs clearly bring about more environmental degradation than would
otherwise be the case. It is ironic that environmental groups paid little attention to the
flexibility issue during the farm bill debates, even though the Administration's flexibility
proposal would probably do more for environmental protection than all the rest of the bill's
environmental provisions combined.
Is this situation reparable? Not entirely at this late date, but the conferees could still
make a number of changes that would significantly enhance flexibility. Let's hope that
farmers, environmentalists, and the Administration can, over the next two weeks, build a
persuasive case for doing that.
Tarl:et Prices/Deficiency Payments: Earlier this year, some' members of the
Agriculture Committees criticized me for being unwilling to specify the Administration's
target price objectives. They wanted those numbers as 1990 campaign fodder, of course!
So there were sound political reasons for us not to provide them at that time. But I also
pointed out that budget constraints would determine the level of income supports for
American agriculture, and that we did not then know what those constraints would be. As
of today, we still don't know, for Congress and the Administration have not yet reached
agreement at the Budget Summit. Hopefully, they will do so within the next few days.
It is possible that a summit agreement will provide the target price/payment base
parameters for U.S. agricultural policy over the next five years. If not that specific, the
agreement will provide a budget sum, and the task of allocating that sum will go to the farm
bill conferees. We will offer our views in that proceeding.

The choice will be to adjust target prices, payment bases, or a combination of the
two, crop by crop. Congress and the Administration must try to work this out in a way that
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will be fair and equitable, and advantageous to American agriculture as a whole.
Su~ar:
American sugar policy has some of the same shortcomings as our dairy
regime. Somebody pays, and the policy debate is over whether that should be the taxpayer,
the consumer, or a combination of the two. In recent years that burden has been entirely
on the consumer, because present legislation calls for the program to operate at no cost to
the taxpayer.

That foundation is now very shaky. With a price support of $0. 18/lb., sugar
production in the United States has expanded, and import quotas have had to be reduced
in order to avoid forfeitures of sugar to the government.
Crunch time is coming, and the answer of our sugar industry has been to add to the
1990 Farm Bill provisions for a stand-by program of marketing allotments. What this means
is that we're about to create another program where the government will artificially shrink
supply in order to protect the taxpayer. What is not mentioned is that this will zap the
consumer even more than at present.
Our view at the beginning of the farm bill debate was that Congress should simply
not tamper with the sugar program in 1990, but should await changes that would be
negotiated in the Uruguay Round. In other words, we and other sugar producing nations
should go down the reform road together. I still believe that makes the most sense. The
House, however, could not resist the temptation to change the program. In our judgement,
they made it worse, and that needs to be corrected in conference. If we're going to change
it, let's make it better! Movement to less market orientation via supply management is
something that should not be accepted.
Marketin~ Loans for OiIseeds: Our soybean producers have pu&hed hard this year
for some kind of legislation to give them a boost in the international marketplace. My
personal view is that the proper way to do this would be through a target price/deficiency
payment program, similar to the one that has long been in place for feed grains and wheat.
But budget considerations made that impractical, so oilseed producers turned to the
marketing loan framework as an alternative.

Unfortunately, there is major budget exposure in this proposed program, and that will
have to be considered during the conference committee deliberations. The Congressional
Budget Office does not now recognize that exposure, but that could change as this process
evolves.
In addition, this program creates at least five or six new program crops -- sunflowers,
safflower, flaxseed, rapeseed, canola, and mustard seed. Market loans for these threaten
to become an administrative nightmare. For some of these crops, a good data base on
either U.S. or international prices does not now exist. It is an impossible task for the
Department to administer programs for which the underlying data is not available. Such a
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situation is bound to generate inequities and distortions. How do we mesh U.S. and world
market prices to make us competitive in an oilseed where there is no world market?
Conferees should look very closely at this entire proposal before we get ourselves in
a position that might do oilseed producers more harm than good.
Studies: Whenever Congress discovers an issue for which legislation would be
premature, or one that is just too hot to handle legislatively, the response is to ask someone
to study it. That someone is usually the Department. The 1990 Farm Bill calls for over 100
studies, surveys and reports to be done on a variety of issues from Canadian alfalfa seed
exports to composting.

We don't mind doing studies, and we believe we do them well. But over 100 of
them? That takes a lot of time, money and manpower. The conferees ought to jettison the
low-priority studies, or give me the privilege of doing so, and let us get on with
administering our many programs.
Micromana2ement: Finally, as a nation we legislate too much these days. We cannot
solve all the problems of the world -- or even of U.S. agriculture -- in Congress. A lot of
these alleged or perceived problems ought to be handled by the private sector, and
legislative bodies ought to keep their hands off. And those which do demand a legislative
solution can often be dealt with at lower levels of government. We seem to be returning
to a trend of trying to solve problems in Washington, D.C., rather than locally, and of
solving problems by regulating everything and everybody. That is a trend that was resisted
ferociously, and with considerable success, by the Reagan Administration, but it has now
come back to challenge the Bush Administration. We intend also to resist Congress'
tendency to micromanage and over-regulate, but we'll need the help of the American public
in doing so.

The 1990 Farm Bill has plenty of examples of Congressional micromanagement. We
do not need a 1,600-page farm bill! It encompasses too much government, too much
direction to farmers, too much regulation, too much infringement in people's lives.
We ought to be able to do better. And we can do better; 1985 proved that. The
question today is, will we? Have we learned from the past, from the mistakes of 1981, or,
as the adage goes, are we doomed to repeat them?
"Back To the Future.. ,A2-Style"
The premise that made the "Back to the Future" movies so enthralling was the ability
of the good guys, as well as the not-so-good guys, to jump aboard an old DeLorean timetravel machine and blast back and forth from past to future, gaining a first hand account of
the cause-and-effect of seemingly insignificant individual actions.
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I've often thought that if I had a time-travel tractor and could take members of
Congress "back to the future," they wouldn't be as eager to resurrect some of the illconceived portions of their dead-and-buried farm bill of 1981 as they seem to be.
But I'm always an optimist. And I'm still confident that clearer visions will ultimately
prevail in the halls of Congress, and they will listen to what America's farmers, and the Bush
Administration, are trying to tell them: Please, we've lived through the past, and we've seen
the future. The past can indeed be a prologue for the 1990 Farm Bill, but the future of
America's farmers should be based not on the tragedy of 1981, but on the triumph of 1985.
Let's build on past successes, not past mistakes. Call your representatives and tell
them to build on '85, not return to '81. Or, just tell them "green means go."
We'll make sure they know what you're talking about.
#

